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The Master Plan for Higher Education 
in California is often touted as the State’s 
penultimate commitment to higher 
education for all who would seek it 
(Douglass, 2010), a shining example of 
higher education’s intended democratizing 
role and function and to the State of 
California’s commitment to ensuring 
upward mobility of its citizens through 
open access, tuition-free, higher 
education.  Unfortunately, though, this 
understanding is limited in that it appears 
to see the Master Plan only through what 
some might deem the rose-colored glasses 
of idealism, of what it once was, rather 
than what it has become.  To fully 
understand the Master Plan, we must 
critique and analyze it, not from the 
standpoint of the romanticized version of 
the plan we so often like to invoke in 
support of higher education in California, 
but through the critical lenses of history 
and context, of institutional posturing and 
self-preservation, and recent neoliberalist 
policies.  It is only by more fully 
understanding the Master Plan both 
within its 1960 context and the shifting 
political climate of the last forty years that 
we can begin to unravel what, if any of it, 
is viable in the 21st century, or if it even is 
worth saving. 
 
History and Context 
 
Like many other U.S. states following 
World War II, California was bracing itself 
for a sharp rise in the number of students 
enrolling in its institutions of higher 
education.  In the decades that preceded, 
California saw massive expansions in 
institutions of higher education at all 
levels, with legislators pursuing new 
campuses in their districts with little 
regard for overall state needs (Callan, 
2009; Douglass, 2000; 2010).  However, 
by the late 1950s, the State’s wartime 
surplus had been all but depleted, and 
California was facing its largest budget 
deficit since the Great Depression 
(Douglass, 2010).  With returning 
veterans’ use of their GI Bills and the 
coming-of-age of Baby Boomers on the 
horizon, both legislative officials and 
higher education administrators saw a 
need to proactively plan and prepare for 
the expansion of higher education in the 
State (Callan, 2009; Douglass, 2000; 2010; 
Geiser & Atkinson, 2010). 
Coinciding with this push to 
thoughtfully prepare for the future was 
the desire of the State’s regional colleges 
(now the California State University 
system), led primarily by Malcolm Love, 
then-president of San Diego State College, 
to expand the purview of the state 
colleges by: 1) removing them from the 
oversight of the State Board of Education 
and creating a separate 
governing/oversight board, similar to the 
University of California’s Board of 
Regents; 2) expanding the degree 
programs of the state colleges to include 
engineering and the doctorate in 
education; and 3) ensuring state funding 
to support research at the state colleges 
(Douglass, 2000).  Rather than fight head-
on the state college presidents as his 
predecessor Robert Gordon Sproul may 
have, newly-appointed University of 
California (UC) president, Clark Kerr, 
began to strategize ways to “move the 
public segments—the university, state 
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 colleges, and junior colleges—toward a 
negotiated settlement and to create ‘an 
orderly plan’ for higher education in 
California” (Douglass, 2000, p. 255), one 
that would ensure the UC’s top-tier 
institution status within the state’s higher 
education system. 
Fearing that the legislature would 
approve new state colleges without 
sufficiently assessing the State’s higher 
education needs and driven to protect the 
UC’s political position and its share of 
state resources, Kerr proposed a study in 
1959 that would bring leaders of the 
already existent tripartite system together 
to construct a compromised, negotiated 
plan to collectively move the state’s higher 
education system forward in an organized, 
cost-effective manner.  Kerr’s hope was 
that this would be enough to stave off 
legislative intrusion and interference into 
the inner workings of higher education 
and settle some of the turf wars—in 
particular, the state colleges’ 
encroachment on the mission of the 
UC—arising in the tripartite system 
(Douglass, 2000; Geiser & Atkinson, 
2010).  Alternatively, and to the disdain of 
State Board of Education members like 
Raymond Daba, Kerr explored the idea of 
the UC’s absorption of the state colleges 
should negotiations fail or the legislature 
not support such a study (Douglass, 
2000).  He also enlisted the help of 
Assemblywoman, Dorothy Donahoe (D), 
by presenting her with “a draft of a 
resolution he hoped she might carry in the 
legislature…[one that would ask] the 
regents and the State Board of Education 
to provide a plan” (Douglass, 2000, p. 
259-260) for higher education and place a 
two-year moratorium on all higher 
education legislation (Callan, 2009).  
Donahoe, a former high school 
administrator and opponent of the 
unchecked growth of the state colleges, 
agreed and presented Assembly 
Concurrent Resolution 88 (ACR 88) to 
the legislature.  Its passage ensured the 
State Board of Education’s acquiescence 
to the study and quelled Kerr’s fears that 
the study may go incomplete, leaving the 
ultimate fate of the UC’s status in the 
hands of the legislature (Callan, 2009; 
Douglass, 2000).  By July of 1959, Kerr 
and State Superintendent of Education, 
Roy Simpson, had assembled a team of 
nine, led by Arthur Coons, president of 
Occidental College, for the Master Plan 
Survey Team (Douglass, 2000). 
As noted by higher education historian 
John Aubrey Douglass (2010), “perhaps 
the most profound impact of the 1960 
Master Plan is not what it changed, but 
what it prevented” (p. 6).  The “California 
Idea”, as proposed by Douglass—open 
access, high quality, affordable higher 
education for all high school graduates—
had long been established in California by 
the Progressives of the early 1900s 
(though it is often erroneously attributed 
as a new goal or ideal set forth by the 
Master Plan), and the 1920s and 1930s 
saw a rapid-response expansion of higher 
education, especially within the 
community and state colleges (Douglass, 
2000; 2010).  Thus, though the state’s 
foreseen need to grow in terms of its 
higher education system(s), as well as its 
longstanding progressive-era belief that 
higher education was an inalienable right 
of its citizens, may have informed or 
aligned with some aspects of the Master 
Plan, they certainly were not new ideals 
created by it.  Rather, the Master Plan 
appears more likely born of the UC’s 
drive to protect its position at the top, 
ensure elite students’ access to the UC, 
and safeguard its hold on state resources 
and is significant more “for what it 
preserved than for what it invented” 
(Douglass, 2010, p. 2). 
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 The Plan: Its Principal Points and 
Early Merits 
 
After many months of laborious and 
sometimes hostile negotiations between 
representatives of the UC, state colleges, 
and community colleges, the California 
Master Plan for Higher Education was 
submitted to the legislature for review in 
February of 1960.  Kerr and 
Superintendent Simpson jointly urged 
legislators to view the sixty-some 
recommendations as a package deal, one 
whose success was reliant upon all points 
being acted on together as a whole, rather 
than as individual stand-alone pieces 
(Douglass, 2000).  At the time of its 
acceptance, the Master Plan solidified the 
state’s existing tripartite system and 
affirmed the notion of California’s 
commitment to universal access to higher 
education (Callan, 2009; Douglass, 2000; 
2010; Geiser & Atkinson, 2010).  Under it, 
clear missions and admissions eligibility 
pools for the three segments of California 
higher education were outlined; a 
governing body similar to the UC Board 
of Regents, the Board of Trustees, was 
established to oversee the state colleges; 
and an advisory body, the Coordinating 
Council for Higher Education, was 
created to review and coordinate the 
budgets, degree programs, and expansion 
of institutions of higher education in 
California. In addition, the Master Plan 
reaffirmed California’s progressive-era 
commitment to make higher education 
affordable and available to all, not only 
recommending an expansion of the state’s 
existing scholarship program, but also 
calling for the creation of a new program 
to provide subsistence grants to 
scholarship awardees (California 
Department of Education, 1960).  In 
short, it appeared as though the framers 
of the Master Plan succeeded in the 
creation of a plan that not only benefited 
the tripartite system both collectively and 
as separate entities, but also provided 
guidance to the legislature in terms of 
planned expansion and ensured citizens of 
California would continue to enjoy open 
access, tuition-free higher education. 
Though well-received by Governor Pat 
Brown and some lawmakers, the Master 
Plan was met with some legislative 
concerns—namely, the creation of an 
autonomous Board of Trustees for the 
state college system and the amendment 
of the state constitution to include the 
Master Plan—and legislative in-fighting 
surrounding how much—or how little—
of the plan should be acted upon.  When 
all was said and done, Kerr’s and 
Simpson’s urging to take the plan as a 
whole went unheeded and only pieces of 
the plan were codified.  Key legislation 
surrounding the Master Plan included a 
constitutional amendment creating the 
Board of Trustees for the California State 
Colleges (now California State University, 
or CSU) and a statute, the Donahoe 
Higher Education Act of 1960, which 
created the Coordinating Council of 
Higher Education, removed the state 
colleges from the oversight of the State 
Board of Education, and outlined the 
differentiated missions of the tripartite 
system institutions.  Interestingly, the 
recommendations of the Master Plan 
often touted as its greatest social 
success—open access to (nearly) tuition-
free higher education for all 
Californians—were not included and have 
never been sanctioned by law, nor have 
the admissions eligibility requirements for 
the UC or the CSU (Douglass, 2000, 
2010).   
Even though the package-deal plan 
was dismantled in terms of statutes, its 
principles led to many deemed successes 
in the 1960s and 1970s.  With clearly 
defined missions and roles in the tripartite 
system, higher education as a whole was 
able to grow and expand expeditiously in 
California.  Mission creep, or the 
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 expansion of established institutions’ 
missions to include areas of higher 
education or degree programs (for 
example, the baccalaureate at the 
community college, the doctorate at state 
universities) not originally included in 
their mission (Longanecker, 2008; 
Morphew, 2002), was kept at bay.  Clearly 
defined roles were also established for the 
legislature, and lawmakers took to funding 
enrollment, while keeping the costs of 
such a large system relatively low for 
taxpayers, rather than attempting to 
micromanage the state colleges, especially, 
or self-servingly seeking to establish 
colleges or universities in their districts 
(Douglass, 2000; 2010).  In short, thanks 
to the Master Plan and the statutes that 
stemmed from it, everyone had a job to 
do and was clear not only on what their 
job was, but also on what it was not.  This 
division of roles and responsibilities 
allowed California’s system of higher 
education to grow in the initial decades 
that followed with few substantial growing 
pains, all the while keeping access to high-
quality higher education open and at a low 
cost to both students and taxpayers. 
 
Challenges to Viability 
 
The Master Plan is not without its 
criticisms, though.  When viewed through 
the lens of neoliberalism—a shift in 
government priorities from ameliorating 
inequality, poverty, and social injustice to 
promoting competition and economic 
growth (Rhoads, Wagoner, & Ryan, 
2009)—the Master Plan, at least in today’s 
context, seems to be less about ensuring a 
well-functioning tripartite system to 
support the universal access of 
California’s citizens to higher education 
and more about perpetuating social 
stratification.  Even with its flaws, the 
Master Plan proved a success in terms of 
facilitating the rapid, efficient, planned 
growth and expansion of higher education 
in California.  The question remains, 
though, as to whether or not the plan is 
viable in the California of today.  
Decreased state funding, increased tuition 
and fees, eligibility requirements and 
enrollment caps, and low transfer rates 
from the community colleges have 
contributed to limiting access to four-year 
higher education in California at a time 
when more students than ever are 
academically prepared and qualified for 
admittance to the UC and CSU (Public 
Policy Institute of California, 2016).   
Perhaps, though, we should take a step 
back and ask first if the plan should be 
viable.  If we circle back to where this 
paper began—with the ideological 
placement of the Master Plan as an 
advocate for universal open access to 
tuition-free (or nearly tuition-free, or at 
least affordable) higher education—few 
would argue that the Master Plan, at least 
in part, should not be held at minimum as 
an aspiration for which we should strive.  
Whether functionalist advocates, 
instrumentalist Marxist critics, or 
institutionalist critics (Dougherty, 2001), 
most would agree that a well-educated 
society is beneficial to all and necessary as 
we move towards more advanced and 
globalized markets and industries.  
However, if the Master Plan is to remain 
even partially feasible or sustainable, those 
areas or issues that have been identified as 
contributing to its demise or non-
functionality, namely the lack of state 
fiscal support and the change in the 
demographics of California and the needs 
of its citizens (Callan, 2009; Douglass, 
2000; 2010; Geiser & Atkinson, 2010; 
Rhoads et al., 2009), must be addressed.  
 
Decreased State Funding 
 
Through the 1960s and 1970s, 
California’s fiscal commitment to higher 
education held strong, with all three levels 
of the tripartite system receiving 
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 substantial support to keep tuition for 
students low or at least modest (Douglass, 
2000, 2010).  Since then, there has been a 
general “disinvestment by state and local 
government in higher education” 
(Douglass, 2010, p. 13), a phenomena 
Rhoads et al. (2009) would deem evidence 
of neoliberalism at work.  The passing of 
Proposition 13 in 1978, which reduced 
property taxes by more than half and 
severely limited future tax increases, has 
had substantial negative consequences on 
higher education in California, and the 
State has been forced to become more 
reliant on those taxes most susceptible to 
economic downturns—sales and income 
(Callan, 2009).  In the 1970s—when 
neoliberal governments and policies first 
began emerging (Davies & Bansel, 
2007)—California’s investment in higher 
education accounted for about 25% of the 
state budget; today—some 40 years into 
neoliberal policy-making—that amount 
has fallen to roughly 10% (Public Policy 
Institute of California, 2016).  
 
Increased Tuition and Fees 
 
The answer to the State’s 
disinvestment cannot be to simply raise 
tuition rates, though.  Over the last twenty 
years, tuition rates at the UC and CSU 
have more than tripled, and community 
college tuition rates have increased by 
almost 40% since 2005 (Public Policy 
Institute of California, 2016).  Although 
financial assistance is available, tuition 
increases make higher education 
unattainable, or perceived as unattainable, 
for low-income Californians.  According 
to a 2014 study, roughly “86% of 
Californians see college affordability as a 
problem” (Public Policy Institute of 
California, 2016, p. 18).  Additionally, 
rather than allocating funds to those 
institutions that enroll and serve the 
majority of California’s college-going 
citizens, the community colleges and 
CSUs, funds are directed towards the 
“continued and costly expansion of the 
University of California” (Callan, 2009, p. 
21), an indication of the state’s lack of 
commitment to the higher education for 
all and ultimately of the success of 
protecting the UCs fiscal resources 
through the Master Plan. 
 
Demographic Changes 
 
Compounding the problem of the 
disinvestment in higher education is the 
exponential population growth and shift 
in demographics in California.  At the 
time of the Master Plan’s inception, 
California’s population was predominantly 
White (92%); by 2015, the state’s 
population was much more diverse, with 
Latinos accounting for 38.8% of the 
State’s population; Whites, 38%; 
Asian/Pacific Islanders, 15.2%; and 
Blacks, 6.5% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016).  
With an increase in underrepresented 
population, the “higher education 
pipeline” (Callan, 2009, p. 17) established 
by the Master Plan does little to serve 
many of California’s citizens.  Nearly a 
decade ago, close to 23% of the State’s 
college-age underrepresented population 
was enrolled at some level of higher 
education; however, only 5% were 
enrolled at four-year institutions (Geiser & 
Atkinson, 2010).  Additionally, nearly half 
of those students enrolled at a community 
college are from low-income families, 
compared to about 25% at the CSU or 
UC (Public Policy Institute of California, 
2016).  Given the barriers of poverty and 
the cumulative inequalities—tracking into 
vocational or general education, access to 
information and college advising.of the K-
12 system they disproportionately 
shoulder, it is little wonder under-
represented students are faced with 
attending community college or nothing at 
all (Callan, 2009; McDonough & Fann, 
2007).   
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Eligibility Requirements and Enrollment Caps 
 
Though the eligibility requirements set 
forth by the Master Plan are not 
sanctioned by law, they are certainly 
enforced in practice, with the UC 
accepting only those from the top 12.5% 
of students and the CSU, from the top 
33% (California Department of 
Education, 1960). Such eligibility 
requirements automatically limit access 
and preclude some students, many of 
those who are underrepresented and/or 
from disadvantaged schools and districts, 
from admittance to the UC and possibly 
to the CSU.  Though the CSU comprises 
the largest state university in the nation, 
California ranks 47th in the percentage of 
students who enroll in four-year 
institutions (Public Policy Institute of 
California, 2016).  Additionally, the State’s 
diverse student population is not evenly 
represented across the tripartite system; 
though student populations at the 
community colleges and CSUs more or 
less reflect the demographics of the 
communities they serve, those at the UC 
do not, with Latino and African American 
students in particular being under-
represented (Policy Institute of California, 
2016). 
During lean fiscal times such as 
recessions, as noted by Callan (2009), it is 
the broad-access institutions of the CSU 
and community college system that have 
suffered enrollment reductions, effectually 
limiting access to hundreds of thousands 
of students who are eligible to be 
admitted.  This is particularly troubling as, 
noted above, it is the CSUs and 
community colleges that enroll the 
greatest percentages of California’s 
underrepresented students.  According to 
the Public Policy Institute of California 
(2016), some 14,000 qualified freshmen 
applicants were turned away from CSUs 
in 2013-2014 alone; with enrollment caps 
remaining and increasing numbers of 
students who are eligible for admission, 
that number will likely continue to rise.  
Because they do not meet the eligibility 
requirements of the UC and are turned 
away by the CSU and community college 
systems due to enrollment caps, many of 
California’s high school graduates are 
denied the open access to higher 
education guaranteed them by the Master 
Plan. 
 
Low Transfer Rates from Community Colleges to 
Four-Year Institutions 
 
Part of what the Master Plan aimed to 
do, and in fact outlined, was establish 
clear and easy transfer from the State’s 
community colleges to the UCs and CSUs 
(California Department of Education, 
1960; Callan, 2009; Douglass, 2000; 2010; 
Geiser & Atkinson, 2010).  Though the 
UCs and CSUs held more stringent 
eligibility requirements under the Master 
Plan, which are problematic in and of 
themselves, students who did not meet 
these requirements and began at 
community colleges would be able to 
transfer to one of these institutions upon 
completing their general education 
requirements at the community college.  
This has yet to be fully realized due to the 
abysmal transfer rates from the 
community colleges to the four-year 
institutions (Brint & Karabel, 1989; 
Callan, 2009; Dougherty, 2001; Douglass, 
2000; 2010; Geiser & Atkinson, 2010; 
Public Policy Institute of California, 
2016).  Though it is estimated nearly half 
of all who enroll in the community college 
system are transfer-directed or intend to 
transfer, only 4% do so within two years 
and 13% within three (Public Policy 
Institute of California, 2016).  
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest 
that enrollment in a community college 
actually reduces students’ likelihood of 
attaining a baccalaureate degree (Geiser & 
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 Atkinson, 2010; Public Policy Institute of 
California, 2016). Only a fifth of those 
who begin in the community college and 
transfer to a four-year institution succeed 
in earning their B.A. (Doughtery, 2001).  
The community colleges of California, 
proposed under the Master Plan to be the 
universal point of entry for those students 
who do not meet admissions eligibility for 
the four-year institutions, appear to have 
become in actuality sieves at best or 
complete roadblocks at worst.  As 
asserted by Burton Clark (1960), “the 
conflict between open-door admission 
and performance of high quality often 
means a wide discrepancy of entering 
students and the means of their 
realization” (p. 571).  Thus, rather than 
acting as the stepping stone they are 
purported to be under the Master Plan, 
community colleges serve the purpose of 
protecting the prestige of the four-year 
universities, “cooling-out” those students 
who are less apt to be successful at the 
UCs or CSUs, thereby limiting social 
mobility and perpetuating social 
stratification and hegemony (Brint & 
Karabel, 1989; Clark, 1960; Callan, 2009; 
Dougherty, 2001; Douglass, 2000; 2010; 
Geiser & Atkinson, 2010).  This is 
especially troubling given the California 
Community Colleges enroll the bulk of 
California’s high school graduates, in 
general, and underrepresented students, in 
particular, who seek higher education 
(Public Policy Institute of California, 
2016).   
 
Conclusion 
 
The Master Plan for Higher Education 
in California is held nationally and 
internationally as one of the most 
successful models for higher education.  
Promising low or no tuition and universal 
access to higher education for all high 
school graduates, it embodies the 
egalitarian ideals of the Progressive Era, 
and its differentiation of mission and clear 
roles and responsibilities in the absence of 
a statewide higher education coordinating 
body undoubtedly helped propel 
California forward in terms of expansive, 
high-quality higher education.  In more 
recent decades, though, the presumed 
ideal of the Master Plan has not only 
faltered but perhaps failed entirely.  With 
decreased state funding, increased tuition 
and fees, stratified admission eligibility 
requirements, caps on enrollment, and 
low transfer rates from the community 
colleges to four-year institutions, 
California has fallen from being at the top 
of the nation’s degree-awarding states to 
ranking near the bottom (Douglass, 2000; 
Callan, 2009; Geiser & Atkinson, 2010; 
Public Policy Institute of California, 
2016).  Rather than being used to promote 
access and opportunity, it seems as 
though the tenets of the Master Plan are 
now being used to limit and avert access 
via eligibility requirements coupled with 
enrollment caps.   
Through this, the UC has escaped 
relatively unscathed, enjoying 
comparatively stable funding, few caps on 
enrollment, and continued access to only 
the highest-performing, most elite high 
school graduates.  Given this, it appears as 
though Clark Kerr’s push to solidify the 
UC’s position at the top of the tripartite 
system succeeded.  Unfortunately, it has 
arguably been at the expense of 
Californians, especially under-represented 
Californians, who wish to pursue 
postsecondary degrees.  This effect may 
be mitigated if: 1) eligibility policies were 
relaxed or expanded; 2) enrollments at 
broad-access institutions were not 
sacrificed by the legislature during times 
of economic downturn; and/or 3) a more 
efficient and effective pathway for transfer 
from the community college to a four-year 
institution were instated; in doing so, 
students, especially under-represented 
students, might actually begin to equitably 
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access—fully access—the egalitarian  
and democratizing higher education utopia  
supposedly created by the Master Plan. 
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